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1. Introduction
This study examines the conditions under which the state is likely to develop
Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs). Workers are currently facing increasing
difficulty adjusting to the rapid change of industrial structures and the expansion of the
service sector. While all the state had to do was steer aggregate demands with Keynesian
macroeconomic policy and provide financial remedies for the unemployed and needy ex
post during the golden age of welfare states, the state is now required to enhance the
employability of citizens—including not just male breadwinners but also long-term
unemployed youth, underprivileged minorities, and single mothers—and integrate them
into the labor market in the post-industrial economy. As a result, active labor market
policy gains its currency among policymakers in advanced industrialized countries. In
fact, international organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and European Union, recommend this policy measure, and many of
the advanced democracies appear to be following their lead (see Armingeon 2007).1 In
addition, evaluation studies of ALMPs are flourishing in economic literature (see, as an
overview, Heckman et al. 1999; Kluve 2006; Martin and Grubb 2001).
Despite the practical importance of this policy field, however, the understanding of
the political determinants of ALMPs is still incomplete and inconsistent in the literature on
comparative political economy. On the one hand, conventional partisan models suggest
that leftist governments contribute to public spending for ALMPs (Boix 1998; Huo et al.
1While the OECD encouraged its member countries to develop ALMPs in OECD (1994a,
1994b, 2010b), the European Union adopted the European Employment Strategy at the
Luxembourg Jobs Summit in 1997 to coordinate active methods.
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2008; Martin and Swank 2004; Swank and Martin 2001). On the other hand, an
“insider–outsider” approach claims that political partisanship has no effect on active labor
market policy because social democratic parties only care about the interests of
labor-market insiders (Rueda 2005, 2006, 2008). Does political partisanship influence
active labor market policy? How can we reconcile these seemingly contradictory claims
among comparative political economists?
This paper maintains that partisan differences in a two-dimensional policy space,
composed of the redistributive “left–right” and the social-value “libertarian–authoritarian”
dimensions, affect the preferences and strategies of political parties for labor market
programs in post-industrial democracies. While party politics researchers have long been
arguing that party systems are being transformed from uni-dimensional to
multi-dimensional in advanced democracies, comparative political economists adhere to the
conventional “left–right” perspective. To bridge the gap between these two strands of
literature, this study presents a theoretical model to explain the policy consequences of
party system transformation under post-industrialization. It argues that political parties
now contend with each other over human capital formation policy on the social-value
dimension as well as the redistributive dimension. The model predicts that a
left–libertarian party prefers activation; a left–authoritarian party, dualism; a
right–libertarian party, workfare; and a right–authoritarian party, dualism or workfare.
Out of these three strategies, facing a policy choice under budget constraints while
activation promotes the expansion of ALMPs, dualism is expected to contribute to social
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protection for male breadwinners, such as early retirement pensions and employment
protection legislation (EPL).
To test the theoretical model, this paper empirically investigates the effects of a
government policy position in the two-dimensional policy space on public spending for
ALMPs and other labor market programs. This study innovatively measures each party’s
policy position in the two-dimensional policy space by constructing an indicator on the
basis of the Comparative Manifesto Project’s data (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al.
2006; Volkens et al. 2009, 2010), and it assesses the effects of government partisanship by
analyzing the time-series and cross-section data of 18 advanced industrialized democracies
from 1985 to 2007 with a unit fixed-effect model. This paper, then, reveals that a
government’s policy positions in the redistributive and social-value dimensions interact
with each other. A left–libertarian government expands public spending for ALMPs,
while a left–authoritarian government promotes employment protection for regular
employees and preserves the generosity of early retirement pensions. The empirical
results suggest that comparative political economists should get beyond the conventional
“left–right” perspective when considering the politics of labor market and employment
policy.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the basic
characteristics of active labor market policy and its economic and political functions.
Section 3 presents a two-dimensional party competition model and its empirical
implications for labor market programs. Section 4 presents data for this paper’s
multivariate regression analyses, and Section 5 explains the analytical methods used in the
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
4
regression analyses. Section 6 shows the results of the time-series and cross-section
analyses, and Section 7 concludes the entire arguments of this paper.
2. Active Labor Market Policy: Concepts, Contents, and Functions
“Active labor market program” (ALMP) is the generic term referring to various
kinds of public programs that aim at integrating the unemployed and underemployed into
the mainstream economy. ALMPs are usually composed of vocational training, job
placement services, temporary financial assistance, employment subsidies, and direct job
creation. In contrast, “passive labor market program” refers to cash benefits directed to
unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, and early retirement pensions
(Kenworthy 2010, 438; Martin and Grubb 2001, 12-3).
ALMPs constitute an important part of “new social risk” policies. As an
increasing number of social scientists start engaging in the debate on this issue, new social
risks are becoming a central research topic in the literature of comparative public policy (cf.
Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2005, 2007; Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002;
Häusermann 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2004b). The concept of new social risks is defined as
social risks emerging owing to post-industrialization and its social and economic
consequences (Taylor-Gooby 2004a, 3). In other words, new social risks are derived from
the emergence of the service economy, massive entry of women into the labor market,
demise of male-dominant/female-caregiver family models, and so on. These risks consist
of, for example, the inability to reconcile paid work and care work, poverty among single
parents, and precarious employment and/or long-term unemployment among poorly
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educated/low-skilled workers. Since new social risks refer to those risks that prevent
citizens from being fully engaged in paid employment, the crucial task of the state is to
integrate those facing new social risks into the labor market through various policy
measures in the post-industrial society. ALMP is a representative example of these policy
tools, which explains why as post-industrialization advances, ALMP attracts increasing
interest from policymakers.
Although ALMPs are now popular as a measure connecting social policies to
economic performance among policymakers, ALMPs do not necessarily benefit all
unemployed citizens in an equitable way. The benefits of ALMPs are concentrated upon
specific demographic groups. First, youth programs are obviously targeted for the
younger, unskilled demographic. Second, as Martin and Grubb’s (2001) meta-analysis of
ALMP evaluation literature shows, on- and off-the-job training and job-search assistance
are intended for all unemployed but particularly help women and single parents to re-enter
the labor market. Third, wage subsidies for private-sector employment are also targeted
for younger, unemployed individuals. To summarize, ALMPs primarily help those who
are young or female to secure a place in the labor market.
This paper’s assumption that political parties differ from one another regarding
ALMPs is based on the fact that the benefits of these programs are skewed to particular
demographic groups. Since the degree of exposure to new social risks varies across
demographic groups, the potential benefits of ALMPs also differ according to each
citizen’s age, gender, skill set, and employment history. If political parties would concern
themselves with maximizing votes as well as developing policy, they would present
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different solutions to unemployment and underemployment problems according to their
targeted constituents.
The next section identifies political parties’ preferences regarding labor market
policy by examining their electoral strategies in post-industrial democracies.
3. Post-industrial Party Competition and Labor Market Policy
This study contends that party competition along a class cleavage and a newly
emerging social-value cleavage determines a political party’s policy preferences for labor
market programs in the post-industrial society. Although it is argued that left–right
politics has been losing its influence on conventional welfare programs in mature welfare
states (e.g., Pierson 1994; Pierson 1996; Ross 2000), partisan differences along the
redistributive dimension still have an impact on each government’s human capital
investment strategies under post-industrialization and global competition (Boix 1997, 1998;
Iversen and Stephens 2008). In general, while leftist parties prefer to employ public
measures to assist the unemployed and invest in human resources, rightist parties opt for
reducing public involvement in unemployment problems and leaving human capital
formation to private measures. Even if the state now places more emphasis on
“recommodifying” aspects of social policy as society shifts from an industrial economy
toward a knowledge-based one (cf. Jessop 2002), there is still room for government
partisanship along the redistributive dimension to affect labor market policy. However,
labor market programs are also debated along the social-value cleavage as well, because
different labor market programs please distinct constituents of pro-welfare parties. As
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
7
Inglehart (1977, 1997), Kitschelt (1994, 1997), and others point out, “new politics,” such as
environmental protection, fulfillment of individual liberty, feminism, and multiculturalism,
appear in the politics of advanced democracies, and, as a result, reactions to such rapid
changes in social values emerge as political issues in those countries. The contention over
the issue of values transforms party systems from being uni-dimensional to
multi-dimensional. Among supporters of pro-welfare parties, professionals and service
sector workers prefer flexible labor markets and a vibrant economy with activation
measures, while organized blue-collar workers prefer strict employment protection and
early retirement programs. Hence, partisan differences around the social-value dimension
influence a government’s policy choices regarding labor market policies. Overall, the
conventional left–right politics along the redistributive dimension interacts with the new
politics along the social-value dimension and then influences labor market policies.
The majority of previous studies on ALMPs agree that the presence of social
democratic governments has a positive effect on the expansion of these programs (Boix
1998; Huo et al. 2008; Janoski 1990, 1994; Martin and Swank 2004; Swank and Martin
2001). Boix theorizes about the partisanship approach to human capital investment policy,
maintaining that leftist and rightist parties have different priorities and employ distinct
supply-side economic policies to maximize growth and reduce unemployment under global
competition (see Boix 1997, 1998). That is, while leftist governments—concerned with
achieving equality as well as growth—increase public spending on human capital formation
to enhance national competitiveness, rightist governments—prioritizing growth over
equality—seek to create an incentive structure to encourage private investment and labor
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supply by cutting taxes and lowering social wages. If Boix’s argument is valid, partisan
differences along the redistributive “left–right” dimension lead to disparate labor market
policies. Leftist governments increase their involvement in ALMPs in order to adapt their
national economies to post-industrialization without sacrificing equality. By contrast,
rightist governments, trying to achieve economic growth as well, deregulate the labor
markets and encourage labor market participation by sanctioning inactivity.
Rueda presents his “insider–outsider” approach as an alternative to the
conventional left–right approach, and maintains that government partisanship has no effect
on ALMPs (Rueda 2005, 2006, 2008). He argues that “social democratic parties have
strong incentives to consider insiders their core constituency” (Rueda 2005, 62). That is,
while social democratic parties have incentives to protect industrial workers as their core
constituents (insiders), these parties are less enthusiastic about promoting the interests of
precarious—such as part-time and fixed-term contract—workers (outsiders). Rueda states
that the presence of leftist governments elevates the strictness of employment protect
legislation, while it does not influence the generosity of ALMPs and unemployment
benefits because both of them are not beneficial for labor market insiders with employment
protection.
Although the left–right partisanship approach and the insider–outsider approach
seemingly contradict each other, this paper claims that we can integrate these two
approaches under a coherent framework. Rueda’s (2005, 2006, 2008) critique of the
conventional left–right approach is valid, as long as he states that leftist parties care less
about ALMPs when they rally support from organized blue-collar labor. However, the
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electoral base of leftist parties is not necessarily limited to unionized male blue-collar
workers, and it is theoretically possible for these parties to appeal to newly emerging
service and professional workers with new social risk policies.2 In essence, potential
constituents of leftist parties are diversified in post-industrial societies, and, as a result,
current leftist parties are facing the choice between sticking to traditional core supporters
and ignoring the policy demands from labor market outsiders, on the one hand, and untying
their organizational constraints with blue-collar unions and seeking electoral support from
public and private service-sector workers and young voters, on the other. The preferences
of leftist parties regarding labor market programs can differ according to their electoral
strategies under post-industrial electoral competition.
This study maintains that leftist parties should be differentiated along the
social-value dimension when we consider their policy preferences with respect to labor
market policies. The social-value position of each political party is a significant
determinant of its policy preferences regarding ALMPs, because the demographic that
potentially benefits from ALMPs overlaps the constituents with libertarian values. For
instance, younger generations tend to align themselves with the libertarian side (Inglehart
1997), and they are more likely to have precarious jobs than older generations and are more
likely to benefit from ALMPs. In addition, women have taken up a large proportion of
service-sector jobs during the process of post-industrialization, and ALMPs help young
2In fact, Häusermann’s analysis of the International Social Survey Program in 1996
suggests that socio-cultural professionals support traditional left parties as much as new left
parties in France and Switzerland, while their support is significantly skewed toward new
left parties in Germany. Whether a social democratic party exclusively serves the material
interests of “insiders” depends on each country’s political context. See Häusermann
(2010a, Chapter 4).
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women smooth out their career hiatus due to childbearing and rearing. In contrast, male
blue-collar workers are less likely to benefit from ALMPs and more likely to have
authoritarian values than other categories (see Häusermann 2010a, Chapter 4). When
leftist parties cajole these organized blue-collar union workers into voting for them, they
are least expected to appeal with ALMPs.
As Figure 1 indicates, this paper maintains that political parties, depending on their
policy position in the two-dimensional policy space, employ three different strategies for
human capital investment policy and form distinct policy preferences for labor market
programs.
[Figure 1 around here]
Left–libertarian parties, supported by newly emerging service and professional
workers, seek activation. Since their goal is to enhance citizens’ employability without
sacrificing equality, they prefer to expand the role of the public sector in human capital
formation. For the left–libertarian parties, ALMPs are an important policy instrument in
integrating young, unemployed individuals into the labor market and in claiming that their
policy is well adapted to the knowledge-based economy. Although actual unemployed
youngsters probably need passive cash benefits as well as active measures, left-libertarian
parties and their constituents prioritize ALMPs over passive labor market programs to
maintain flexible labor markets for the service sector and prevent social exclusion and
welfare dependency.
Left–authoritarian parties, which rally traditional blue-collar workers, opt for
dualism. A dualism approach generates two different types of labor markets: the labor
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market for protected unionized industrial workers (insiders) and the one for part-time and
term-limited contract workers (outsiders) (cf. Palier and Thelen 2010). Since
left–authoritarian parties seek electoral support from male-dominant blue-collar unions in
the manufacturing sector, they prioritize the job protection of male industrial workers over
other labor market programs. While these parties care less about ALMPs because the
programs are less likely to benefit labor market insiders, they do have incentives to protect
early retirement programs against welfare retrenchment and promote employment
protection regulation for labor market insiders.
Right–libertarian parties develop workfare strategies. These parties encourage
labor force participation and adapt the national economy to post-industrialization by
deregulating the labor market and enhancing its flexibility. Since right–libertarian parties
intend to downsize the public sector, they do not prefer increasing public intervention in
human capital formation with either active or passive labor market programs. Rather,
these parties enhance labor mobility and ensure the supply of cheap labor by sanctioning
inactivity.
Right-authoritarian parties prefer either dualism or workfare, depending on the
configuration of their core constituencies. If right–authoritarian parties try to please the
capitalist and management class, they adopt the workfare strategy. On the other hand, if
they seek electoral support from traditionalist blue-collar workers and the old middle-class,
they prefer dualism.
This paper’s argument—political parties have distinct preferences with respect to
labor market programs according to their policy position in the two-dimensional party
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competition space—leads to the following hypotheses. First, if partisan differences have
an influence on a government’s policy choice regarding labor market programs, the
expansion of ALMPs requires a “left” and “libertarian” government. Second, a “left” and
“authoritarian” government prioritizes labor market programs for insiders, such as early
retirement pensions and employment protection legislation over ALMPs. In later sections,
this paper empirically explores the validity of these two hypotheses.
4. Data
Dependent Variables
This study analyzes data from18 advanced industrialized countries for the time
period of 1985 to 2007.3 Its main dependent variable is Public Expenditures for ALMPs
as a Percentage of GDP, the data of which come from the OECD (2010a). In the
OECD’s classification, ALMPs include (1) public employment service and administration,
(2) training, (3) job rotation and job sharing, (4) employment incentives, (5) supported
employment and rehabilitation, (6) direct job creation, and (7) start-up incentives. Figure
2 shows the temporal variations of public spending for ALMPs, by country, from 1985 to
2007.
[Figure 2 around here]
To compare the effects of government partisanship between ALMPs and other
labor market programs for labor market insiders, this study also uses as its dependent
3These 18 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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variables Public Expenditures for Early Retirement Programs as a Percentage of GDP and
Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for Regular Employment. The
former measures public spending devoted to early retirement programs, which is classified
as “No. 90: Early Retirement” in the OECD (2010a) Labour market programmes:
Expenditure and participants. As is well known in the literature on comparative political
economy, many advanced industrialized countries responded to mass unemployment after
the oil crisis of the 1970s with the expansion of early retirement programs. That is, the
countries tried to eliminate redundant workers and restore the balance of labor demand and
supply by coaxing older, less-productive workers from the labor market with the incentive
of early retirement pensions (cf. Ebbinghaus 2006). Besides the efficacy of those labor
market programs, the potential beneficiaries differ sharply between ALMPs and early
retirement pensions. The latter programs benefit mainly older unionized workers with
stable job tenures, and therefore it is expected that left—authoritarian parties prioritize the
preservation of early retirement programs over the development of ALMPs.
The Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for Regular
Employment measures “the stringency of national legislation on employment protection for
regular job types” (OECD 2011). OECD’s (2011) database Labour market programmes:
Employment Protection reports the strictness of EPL for four different categories: collective
dismissals, overall employment, regular employment, and temporary employment. To
assess the partisan differences over labor market programs for insiders, this study uses the
degree of stringency of EPL for regular employment as its dependent variable. It is a
composite index of regulatory legislation regarding the following nine items: (1) dismissal
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notification procedures, (2) delay involved before notice, (3) length of the notice period, (4)
severance pay, (5) definition of “unfair dismissal,” (6) length of the trial period, (7)
compensation following unfair dismissal, (8) possibility of reinstatement following unfair
dismissal, and (9) maximum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal (Venn 2009, 38-9).
Since the definition of “labor market insiders” hinges on the presence of workers protected
against dismissal regardless of economic exigencies (cf. Rueda 2005), trade unions
organizing male industrial workers and political parties relying on the support of those
workers have a core stake on stringent EPL.
Explanatory Variables
To test the influence of party competition along the social-value dimension as well
as the redistributive dimension over labor market policy, this study utilizes a recently
constructed new dataset, which is essentially an extended and updated version of Tsebelis’s
(n.d.) Veto Players Dataset with the newest data on government composition. While
Tsebelis’s dataset does not consider the social-value dimension, does not cover Italian and
Japanese data after their respective party system transformations in the mid-1990s, and
ends in 1999, this study’s dataset covers the social libertarian–authoritarian dimension as
well as the economic left–right dimension by using the Comparative Manifestos Project’s
(CMP) data (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2009, 2010) and
extends the time period until 2007 with the data from various issues of the European
Journal of Political Research.
[Table 1 around here]
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This dataset locates each political party’s policy position in the two-dimensional
policy space with CMP’s data. To estimate each political party’s policy positions in the
redistributive left–right and the social-value libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, the new
dataset generates two indicators: Economic Left–Right Policy Position and Social
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position. CMP assigns each sentence in electoral
programs to one of 56 predetermined categories and calculates the ratio of each category in
each electoral manifesto. Following McDonald and Mendes (2001, 108-11), while this
dataset attributes 13 categories to “Left” and 9 categories to “Right,” it ascribes 5
categories each to “Libertarian” and “Authoritarian” (see Table 1). An Economic
Left–Right Policy Position subtracts the score of “Left” categories from that of “Right”
categories (‘–’ = left; ‘+’ = right) in each country and each election. In the same way, a
Social Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position subtracts the score of “Libertarian”
categories from that of “Authoritarian” categories (‘–’ = libertarian; ‘+’ = authoritarian) in
each country and each election. This study assumes that political parties maintain their
policy positions during the interval between elections, and it transforms the left–right and
the libertarian–authoritarian scores into annual data on the basis of this assumption.
Although separating the social-value dimension from the economic left–right dimension
makes no sense unless these two dimensions are orthogonal to each other, the
two-dimensional policy space appears conceptually and substantively valid. As Figure 3
demonstrates, the correlation between Economic Left–Right Policy Position and Social
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position is quite weak (Pearson’s r = 0.211 for all parties
in the 18 countries, 1985–2010).
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[Figure 3 around here]
After each political party’s policy positions are located on the left–right as well as
the libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, each single-party or coalition government’s policy
positions in these two dimensions are estimated. The dataset uses, as the measure of each
government’s policy position, an average of each coalition party’s policy position weighted
by its share of seats in the lower house among governing parties, calculated using the
following equation:
Government Policy Position = ෍ P୧୬
୧
W୧ ,
where denotes a coalition party i’s policy position in either the left–right dimension or
the libertarian–authoritarian dimension, and indicates a coalition party i’s decimal
share of seats to the entire ruling coalition’s seats in the lower house. On the basis of the
data of each government’s policy position, I calculated Government Left–Right Policy
Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position. These variables are
the annual scores of government policy position in the redistributive left–right and the
social libertarian–authoritarian dimensions, respectively, weighted by the duration of
cabinets in each year.
Control Variables
iP
iW
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
17
As control variables, I put economic institutional, politico-economic, and business
cyclical variables into regression models (see detailed variable definitions and sources in
Appendix). Since dependent variables concern the intensity of public involvement,
following the power resources theory, this paper examines the relationship between labor
market programs and Union Density (cf. Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1983; Stephens
1979). Higher union density is expected to be related to well-developed ALMPs,
generous early retirement programs, and strict EPL.
The degree of Wage Bargaining Centralization is also considered an important
determinant of ALMPs. As the Rehn–Meidner model suggests, while solidaristic wage
coordination puts pressure on less productive firms to restructure their production lines and
reduce their workforce, it creates labor demands in higher-productive firms and sectors (cf.
Rehn 1985). As a result, solidaristic wage-setting requires the state to reallocate its labor
force from less productive work places to more productive ones with ALMPs. Thus, the
higher degree of wage bargaining coordination is supposed to lead to the greater efforts of
the state on behalf of ALMPs and vice versa. However, the effects of wage bargaining
institutions on early retirement programs and EPL are not clear.
To assess the influences of post-industrialization, the percentage of Service Sector
Employment is put into regression models. The theoretical expectation of
post-industrialization’s effects on labor market programs is unclear in comparative political
economy. On the one hand, since deindustrialization exposes industrial workers to the
risk of unemployment and generates a huge amount of precarious jobs in the service sector,
it requires the state to expand its welfare programs to protect vulnerable individuals against
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
18
social risks (Iversen and Cusack 2000). It is expected that post-industrialization will lead
to the expansion of ALMPs and early retirement programs. On the other hand,
post-industrialization is also accompanied by “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001). That
is, post-industrialization comes with stagnant economic growth, lower fertility rates, and an
aging population. These factors put downward pressure on the expansion of welfare states
and deprive them of responding to unemployment problems with ALMPs and other labor
market programs.
To assess the effects of each country’s exposure to the globalized economy,
following Rueda (2006, 2008), this study puts the degree of Trade Openness and Capital
Mobility into regression equations. The effects of internationalization and globalization
on welfare states are, in general, inconclusive in comparative political economy. On the
one hand, globalization theorists argue that the integration of national economies into the
global market forces national governments to “race to the bottom,” and as a result, it
curtails the size of welfare states. On the other hand, as an open economy exposes labor
to various social risks, internationalization and globalization generate higher demands for
social protection against those risks (cf. Cameron 1978; Garrett 1998; Katzenstein 1985).
Either way, these effects need to be controlled when assessing the effects of government
partisanship on public spending.
Finally, due to obvious reasons, Unemployment Rate and Real GDP Growth Rate
are added to the regression models. Recession brings about higher unemployment rates,
and the latter creates the demand for ALMPs and early retirement programs. This study
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also puts Consumer Price Index into regression models to control for the effects of inflation.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables.
[Table 2 around here]
5. Method
Since the dataset comprises pooled time-series and cross-section (TSCS) data, this
study uses a dynamic model with unit-fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors in
order to estimate the effects of independent variables on a dependent variable. Analyzing
cross-national and temporal variations of government programs requires researchers to
choose analytical methods with caution, because the selection of methods drastically
changes the results. Since controlling for every possible country-specific factor is
virtually impossible, a unit-fixed effect model is generally preferable to avoid omitted
variable biases in comparative political economy.4 A unit-fixed-effect model is a
parameter-estimation method that puts unit dummy variables into regression, and then these
unit dummies perfectly absorb unobservable country-specific effects.5 Since this study’s
primary explanatory variables (government partisanship) have sufficient variations in each
unit (i.e., each country), this paper uses a unit-fixed effect model.
4However, a unit-fixed effect model is inappropriate when dependent and/or independent
variables are less varied across time. See Plümper et al. (2005).
5This is because fixed-effect models can be transformed into the following equation
(Plümper et al. 2005, 331):
)e-(e)x-(xy-y iti,ik,ti,k,kiti,   ,
where y denotes a dependent variable, x the vector of constant and k independent variables,
e residuals, i a unit, and t a time period.
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Although analyzing the level of government spending as a percentage of GDP with
a lagged dependent variable is sometimes regarded as a conventional method, this approach
also presents a problem. Because the level of public expenditures is slowly changing and
tends to be expanding, using it as a dependent variable can violate the assumption of
stationarity. To avoid the problems originating from non-stationary data, this paper uses
first differences (annual changes) of Public Spending for ALMPs, Public Spending for
Early Retirement Programs, and Strictness of EPL for Regular Employment as its
dependent variables (cf. Kittel and Winner 2005). This choice of analytical method is also
theoretically justifiable because the cabinet’s policy positions are supposed to affect, not
absolute levels, but changes in labor market programs.
To address contemporaneous heteroscedasticity across countries, this study uses
panel-corrected standard errors (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). In addition,
serial correlations of residuals are incorporated into the regression models with a lagged
level dependent variable.6 Finally, all independent variables are one-year lagged. This
approach can avoid possible endogeneity between explanatory and explained variables, and
also agree with the reasonable assumption that a typical budgeting process occurs in the
6In sum, this study’s models can be summarized in the following equation:
∆ ௧ܻ =
ߜ ௧ܻି ଵ + ߚଵܥ݁݊ ݐ௧ି ଵ + ߚଶܷ݊ ݋݅݊ ௧ି ଵ + ߚଷܵ݁ ݎ݅ݒ ܿ݁ ௧ି ଵ + ߚସܱ݌݁݊ ௧ି ଵ + ߚହܥܽ݌ܯ ݋ܾ ݈݅ ݅ݐݕ௧ି ଵ +
ߚ଺ܷ݊݁݉ ݌௧ି ଵ + ߚ଻ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௧ି ଵ + ߚଽܥܲܫ௧ି ଵ + ߚଵ଴݁ܮ ݂ܴݐ ݅݃ ℎݐ௧ି ଵ + ߚଵଵ݅ܮ ܾܣݑݐℎ௧ି ଵ +
ߚଵଶ݁ܮ ݂ܴݐ ݅݃ ℎݐ௧ି ଵ × ݅ܮ ܾܣݑݐℎ௧ି ଵ + ∑ߙ௜+ߝ௜௧,
where Y indicates a dependent variable, α country dummies, ε error terms, i unit, and t
time period. See, e.g., Beck and Katz (1996), Iversen and Cusack (2000), and Kittel and
Winner (2005).
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year previous to the current fiscal year, and political factors influence the budgeting politics
in the previous year.
6. Findings
This section reports the results of this study’s multivariate regression models.
First, it presents the effects of explanatory variables on ALMP spending. Second, this
section compares the effects of partisan variables on early retirement spending and the
strictness of EPL for regular employment for those on ALMPs. This study’s central
interest is the interaction effects between economic left–right policy positions and
social-value libertarian–authoritarian policy positions.
[Table 3 around here]
Table 3 presents the estimates for the determinants of the annual changes in public
spending for ALMPs. Among socioeconomic and economic institutional factors, the
coefficients of real GDP growth rates clearly show their statistically significant effects.
Economic downturns urge welfare states to expand ALMPs due to the increase in
unemployment. The coefficients of the Consumer Price Index also indicate positive
effects on the annual changes of ALMP spending with statistical significance. Although
the coefficients of wage bargaining centralization indicate expected, positive signs, their
significance levels do not reach the conventional threshold (p-value < 0.05). On the
contrary, the variable of international economic integration appears to have significant,
negative effects on ALMPs in fixed-effect models (Models A1 to A4). The regression
models suggest, for instance, that the increase of international trade by 10% of GDP
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
22
diminishes the annual increase of ALMPs by 0.02% of GDP.7 However, when country
dummies are excluded, the variable of trade openness loses its statistical significance
(Model A5).
The interpretation of political variables requires cautious consideration. Mode A1
includes only Government Left–Right Policy Position in its equation with control variables,
and, as conventional partisan models suggest, Model A1 demonstrates, with marginal
statistical significance, that while rightist governments diminish ALMP efforts, leftist
governments actually expand public spending for ALMPs. By contrast, Model A2 puts
the Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position into the equation instead. The
model suggests that libertarian governments have different effects on ALMPs than
authoritarian governments, but these effects are not statistically significant.
Model A3 puts the Government Left–Right Policy Position, the Government
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position, and the interaction term between these two
variables into its regression equation with control variables. On the one hand, the model
indicates that the Government Left–Right Policy Position maintains its statistically
significant, negative effects on public spending for ALMPs even after the effects of the
government social-value position and the interaction effects between the government
redistributive position and social-value position are put into the equation. On the other
hand, the interaction term between the Government Left–Right Policy Position and
Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position does not show its statistically
significant effects. However, the interaction effects are unable to be interpreted solely
7The coefficient of Trade Openness (-0.002) × 10 = -0.02.
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through the regression table (cf. Kam and Franzese 2007). Hence, this study calculates
the marginal effects of a government’s left–right policy position on ALMPs, contingent
upon its libertarian–authoritarian policy position, using Model A3’s variance-covariance
matrix.8
[Figure 4 around here]
Figure 4 illuminates the effects of a government’s left–right policy position on the
ALMP efforts relying on its libertarian–authoritarian policy position. As long as a
government’s policy position is located on the libertarian side (i.e., negative on the
horizontal axis), the coefficient of the Government Left–Right Policy Position remains
negative, which implies that a left government increases public spending for ALMPs.
However, the coefficient of the Government Left–Right Policy Position becomes
statistically indistinguishable from zero when the Government Libertarian–Authoritarian
Policy Position approaches 0.1. This result suggests that left-libertarian governments are
in favor of the expansion of ALMPs, while left-authoritarians are not.
[Table 4 around here]
Table 4 shows the results of the regression models, replacing the dependent
variable in Table 3 with the annual changes of public spending for early retirement
programs and the strictness of EPL for regular employment. Models B1 and B2 estimate
the effects of explanatory variables on Public Spending for Early Retirement Programs as a
percentage of GDP. Although none of the government partisan variables and their
interaction term become statistically significant, this study calculates the marginal effects of
8 Following the recommended methods of Kam and Franzese (2007).
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a government’s left–right policy position on early retirement programs, contingent upon its
libertarian–authoritarian policy position, by using Model B2’s variance-covariance matrix,
because the simple regression table is incapable of demonstrating the interaction effects.
Figure 5 suggests that, although the marginal effects never become statistically significant
with the conventional threshold (95% confidence level), the estimated effects agree with
this study’s hypothesis with a 90% confidence level. While the marginal effects of a
government’s left–right policy position are statistically indistinguishable from zero when a
government is located on the libertarian side (i.e., negative on the horizontal axis), the
marginal effects become negative with 90% confidence when a government is located on
the authoritarian side above 0.1 level. That is, while left-libertarian governments have no
effects on early retirement programs, left-authoritarian governments do.
[Figure 5 around here]
Models B3 and B4 estimate the effects of explanatory variables on the strictness of
EPL for regular employment. While the coefficient of the Government Left–Right Policy
Position maintains its negative sign in Model B3, it becomes positive in Model B4.
Instead, the coefficients of the Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position and
the interaction term become negative with statistical significance there. This study also
calculates the marginal effects of a government’s left–right policy position on the strictness
of EPL for regular employment, contingent upon its libertarian–authoritarian policy
position, by using Model B4’s variance-covariance matrix (see Figure 6). The results are
hard to interpret. Figure 6 shows that left-authoritarian governments promote the strict
EPL for regular workers, while left-libertarian governments diminish the strictness of EPL
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for them. However, this figure also suggests that right-libertarian governments actually
promote the strictness of EPL. These perplexing results might derive from the fact that
the indicator of EPL, complied by the OECD (2011), has large cross-national variation but
scarce temporal variation (cf. Emmenegger 2010, 337). Nonetheless, it can be inferred
from these results, at least, that the effects of government partisanship on the strictness of
EPL for regular workers are not identical between left-libertarian and left-authoritarian
governments.
[Figure 6 around here]
7. Conclusion
This paper examined active labor market policy as a representative example of
new social risk policies and explored whether partisan differences have had an impact on
the changes in public spending for labor market programs. It argued that political parties
contend with each other over unemployment problems and human capital formation policy
in the social-value dimension as well as the redistributive dimension, and that each political
party has different policy preferences and strategies with respect to labor market policy,
according to its position in the two-dimensional party competition space. That is, a
left–libertarian party prefers activation; a left–authoritarian party, dualism; a
right–libertarian party, workfare; and a right–authoritarian party, dualism or workfare.
Among these strategies, while activation is conducive to the expansion of ALMPs, dualism
promotes labor market programs for labor market insiders. Assuming that different party
policies have a distinct impact on labor market policy, this article hypothesized that a
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government’s policy position has contrasting effects on labor market programs—public
expenditures for ALMPs, those for early retirement programs, and the strictness of EPL for
regular employment—between left–libertarian and left–authoritarian governments. By
using multivariate regression methods to analyze the pooled time-series and cross-section
data from18 OECD countries for the time period from 1985 to 2007, this paper revealed
that a government’s left–right policy position interacts with its libertarian–authoritarian
policy position, and that a left-libertarian government raises its budget for ALMPs while a
left–authoritarian government does not. In addition, this paper’s empirical analysis
suggested that a left–authoritarian government increases public spending for early
retirement programs and contributes to strict job security legislation, while a left-libertarian
government does not. The effects of government partisanship on labor market policy are
in distinct contrast to left–libertarian and left–authoritarian governments.
This study has several implications for the literature of comparative politics.
First, this paper revealed that the politics of new social risks is structured, not by a
uni-dimensional left–right policy space, but by a two-dimensional party competition space
in post-industrial democracies. This paper empirically measured a political party’s policy
position on the social-value dimension as well as the redistributive dimension, and assessed
its effects on labor market programs for labor market outsiders and insiders. Although
students of Western European party politics have already pointed out the emergence of the
social-value cleavage—the so-called “new politics”—since Inglehart’s seminal work (Betz
and Immerfall 1998; Bornschier 2010; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Inglehart 1977, 1984;
Kitschelt 1994, 1997; Kriesi 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008), few comparative welfare state
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scholars have explored whether the transformation of party systems has had any impact on
the restructuring of welfare states in advanced democracies.9 This paper empirically
demonstrated that political competition over labor market policy is conducted in the
two-dimensional policy space. This study’s empirical approach and results defy the
conventional “left–right” perspective in the literature on comparative political economy.
Second, this article exemplified that leftist parties need to be differentiated
according to their policy position in the social-value dimension. Rueda (2005, 2006,
2008) argues that current social democratic parties are severely constrained by the interests
of labor market insiders. In contrast, this study’s empirical results suggest that whether a
leftist party defends labor market outsiders depends on its policy position along the
social-value dimension. This paper showed that although a government’s “left” position
does not necessarily help young precarious workers to enhance their employability and find
a job in the labor market, a “left–libertarian” government tries to provide active measures
for labor market outsiders. This study’s multi-dimensional approach can deepen the
understanding of the politics concerning the insider–outsider cleavage.
Finally, this paper illuminated how politics functions as an intervening factor
between socioeconomic changes and public policy. Post-industrialization has transformed
industrial structures and the profiles of labor force in each country. However, the
transformation of a national economy and socio-demographic factors does not
automatically translate to the restructuring of social policy. The socioeconomic changes
9Häusermann’s (2006, 2010a, 2010b) works are exceptional in this respect.
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are converted into new social policies through political competition, which is reshaped
under post-industrial party systems.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2011-003
29
Appendix: Control Variables
 Union Density. Net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in
employment. Union Density = Net Union Membership*100 / Wage and Salary
Earners in Employment. Source: Visser (2009).
 Wage Bargaining Centralization. Index created by Visser. Summary measure of
centralization and coordination of union wage bargaining, taking into account both
union authority and union concentration at multiple levels. Source: Visser (2009).
 Service Sector Employment. Male and female employment in services as % of total
civilian employment. Source: OECD (2000, 2009).
 Trade Openness. Trade openness of the economy, measured by the total trade (sum of
import and export) as percentage of GDP. Source: Penn World Table (Heston et al.
2009).
 Capital Mobility. Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, measured by the
total of foreign direct investment inflow (% of GDP) and outflow (% of GDP).
Source: UNCTAD (n.d.).
 Real GDP Growth. Real GDP growth rates. Source: IMF (n.d.).
 GDP Per Capita. This variable indicates the logarithm of real GDP per capita
(Purchasing Power Parity) in current international dollars. Source: IMF (n.d.).
 CPI. Consumer price index, annual percent change. Source: IMF (n.d.).
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Table 1. Subtractive Measures of Economic Left–Right and Social Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Positions
Note: Numbering corresponds to CMP.
Source: McDonald and Mendes (2001, 108–111).
Economic categories Social categories
Left Right Libertarian Authoritarian
302 Centralization: pro 301 Decentralization 602 National way of life: con 601 National way of life: pro
403 Market regulation 401 Free enterprise 604 Traditional morality: con 603 Traditional morality: pro
404 Economic planning 407 Protectionism: con 607 Multiculturalism: pro 608 Multiculturalism: con
405 Corporatism 410 Productivity 705 Minority groups: pro 605 Law and order
406 Protectionism: pro 411 Infrastructure 706 Non-economic groups 606 Social harmony
409 Keynesian economics 414 Economic orthodoxy
412 Controlled economy 505 Welfare: con
413 Nationalization 507 Education: con
415 Marxism 702 Labor groups: con
503 Social justice
504 Welfare: pro
506 Education: pro
701 Labor groups: pro
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable N Min Mean Max b/w S.D. within S.D.Overall S.D.
Dependent Variables
∆Public spending for ALMPs as % of GDP 371 –0.645 –0.004 0.619 0.115 0.021 0.114
∆Public spending for Early Retirement
Programs as % of GDP 385 –0.187 –0.004 0.274 0.035 0.008 0.034
∆Strictness of Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL) for Regular Employment 391 –0.550 –0.000 0.500 0.052 0.013 0.051
Independent Variables
Real GDP growth 414 –6.013 2.710 11.488 1.906 0.854 1.715
Consumer price index (CPI) 414 –1.000 2.684 15.762 2.049 0.891 1.856
Union density 409 7.991 40.159 87.427 21.033 20.894 5.118
Wage bargaining centralization 405 0.203 0.434 0.941 0.148 0.146 0.040
Service sector employment 414 52.900 67.742 78.800 6.045 4.945 3.659
Trade openness 414 16.106 69.832 184.308 35.224 34.402 10.968
Capital mobility 390 –8.616 5.686 48.935 6.813 5.481 5.659
Government left–right policy position 397 –0.380 –0.062 0.238 0.124 0.076 0.100
Government libertarian–authoritarian policy
position 397 –0.268 0.029 0.276 0.070 0.032 0.063
Note: S.D. = Standard Deviation
Source: See Data Section and Appendix.
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Table 3. Regression of Annual Changes in Public Spending for ALMPs: 1985—2007
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5)
Public Spending for ALMPs –0.111 –0.119 –0.113 - –0.044
(% of GDP) (t–1) (0.056)* (0.058)* (0.055)* - (0.029)
Wage Bargaining Centralization 0.110 0.107 0.103 0.226 0.034
(t–1) (0.174) (0.176) (0.175) (0.182) (0.036)
Union Density (t–1) –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 –0.006 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.000)
Service Sector Employment –0.002 0.000 –0.002 –0.005 –0.001
(t-1) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)+ (0.001)
Trade Openness (t–1) –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 0.000
(0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.001)* (0.000)
Capital Mobility (t–1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment Rate (t–1) 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Real GDP Growth Rate (t–1) –0.014 –0.014 –0.014 –0.014 –0.016
(0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.003)**
Consumer Price Index (t–1) 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008
(0.005)* (0.005)+ (0.005)+ (0.005)* (0.003)*
Left–Right Policy Position –0.149 - –0.171 –0.195 –0.162
(t–1) (0.076)+ - (0.076)* (0.079)* (0.060)**
Libertarian–Authoritarian - –0.148 0.015 –0.011 –0.010
Policy Position (t–1) - (0.094) (0.116) (0.116) (0.094)
Left-Right×Libertarian– - - 1.173 1.026 1.071
Authoritarian (t–1) - - (0.740) (0.750) (0.681)
Constant 0.211 0.124 0.183 0.397 0.068
(0.228) (0.237) (0.227) (0.195)* (0.087)
Observations 334 334 334 334 334
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18
ܴ2 0.232 0.224 0.240 0.210 0.163
Model FE FE FE FE OLS
1. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
3. FE = unit fixed-effect model; OLS = ordinary least square without unit dummies.
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Table 4. Regression of Annual Changes in Public Spending for Early Retirement
Programs and Strictness of EPL for Regular Employment: 1985—2007
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
Dependent Variables EarlyRetirement
Early
Retirement EPL EPL
Public Spending for Early Retirement —0.165* —0.163* - -
Programs (% of GDP) (t—1) (0.066) (0.067) - -
Strictness of EPL for Regular - - —0.135** —0.114*
Employment (t—1) - - (0.051) (0.049)
Wage Bargaining Centralization (t—1) —0.120* —0.117* 0.209* 0.217*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.102) (0.099)
Union Density (t—1) 0.000 0.000 —0.004* —0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Service Sector Employment (t—1) —0.001 —0.001 —0.002 —0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Openness (t—1) 0.000 0.000 —0.001* —0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Mobility (t—1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate (t—1) —0.001 —0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Real GDP Growth Rate (t—1) 0.002+ 0.002* 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Consumer Price Index (t—1) 0.001 0.001 —0.003 —0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Left—Right Policy Position (t—1) —0.008 0.001 —0.004 0.045
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032)
Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy - —0.024 - —0.184*
Position (t—1) - (0.047) - (0.077)
Left-Right × Libertarian-Authoritarian - —0.303 - —1.387**
(t—1) - (0.223) - (0.384)
Constant 0.073 0.074 0.178 0.150
(0.053) (0.051) (0.125) (0.125)
Observations 346 346 352 352
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
ܴଶ 0.144 0.148 0.136 0.173
Model FE FE FE FE
1. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
2. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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3. FE = unit fixed-effect model.
Figure 1. Partisan Differences on the Two-dimensional Party Competition Space
Source: Created by the author.
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Figure 2. Time Trend of Public Expenditures for Active Labor Market Programs
(ALMPs) by Country: 1985—2007
Note: AUL = Australia, AUS = Austria, BEL = Belgium, CAN = Canada, DEN =
Denmark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = Germany, IRE = Ireland, ITA = Italy,
JPN = Japan, NET = The Netherlands, NOR = Norway, NZL = New Zealand, SWE =
Sweden, SWZ = Switzerland, UKM = United Kingdom, and USA = The United States
of America.
Source: (OECD 2010a).
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Figure 3. Scatter Plot between Economic Policy Position and Social-value Policy
Position for All Parties in 18 Countries: 1985–2010
Note: Data for party policy position in the latter 2000s are missing for most countries.
Source: See Data Section.
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Figure 4. Estimated Interaction Effects between Government Left–Right Policy
Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position on ALMPs in
Model A4
Source: Created by the author.
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Figure 5. Estimated Interaction Effects Between Government Left–Right Policy
Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position on Public
Spending for Early Retirement Programs in Model B2
Source: Created by the author.
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Figure 6. Estimated Interaction Effects between Government Left–Right Policy
Position and Government Libertarian–Authoritarian Policy Position on the
Strictness of EPL for Regular Employment in Model B4
Source: Created by the author.
